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Abstract—Although there are many approaches for developing
secure programs, they are not necessarily helpful for evaluating
the security of a pre-existing program. Software metrics promise
an easy way of comparing the relative security of two programs
or assessing the security impact of modifications to an existing
one. Most studies in this area focus on high level source code
but this approach fails to take compiler-specific code generation
into account. In this work we describe a set of object-oriented
Java bytecode security metrics which are capable of assessing the
security of a compiled program from the point of view of potential
information flow. These metrics can be used to compare the
security of programs or assess the effect of program modifications
on security using a tool which we have developed to automatically
measure the security of a given Java bytecode program in terms
of the accessibility of distinguished ‘classified’ attributes.
Index Terms—Object-Orientation, Security Metrics, Security
Analyser, Java Bytecode
I. INTRODUCTION
Security is a critical aspect of software development, and
there exist various approaches which aim to reduce secu-
rity risks and vulnerabilities either through careful coding
practices [1] [2] or through static analysis of the code’s
properties [3] [4] [5]. However, these techniques require
considerable skill and effort to apply successfully, and are
not always applicable to pre-existing programs. Alternatively,
security metrics which quantify the security level of a given
program [6] could offer a ‘pushbutton’ solution which can be
applied easily to given programs.
Most existing security metrics are based on high-level
code [6] which does not always give reliable results because
analysing source code does not take compiler-specific code
generation into account. On the other hand, low-level metrics,
e.g., those derived from Java bytecode instructions, could pro-
vide better information about the executable program [7] [8].
Dynamic metrics have been studied in many projects due
to their importance and reliability [7], including the relation-
ships between static and dynamic coupling metrics [8]. Java
dynamic metrics have also been studied extensively, including
Dufour et al.’s work [7] which defines a number of Java
dynamic metrics to evaluate compiler optimisations. Binder
and Hulass’ study into control flow metrics is also relevant [9].
In our previous work [10] [11] [12] we defined several
security metrics for UML class designs, and described a
tool for automatically evaluating such metrics [13]. These
metrics assess the potential flow of ‘classified’ information by
measuring the accessibility of selected data items based on the
security design principles of “reducing the size of the attack
surface” [14] [15] and “granting least privilege” [16] [17] [2].
They allow software developers to easily assess the impact of
code modifications on overall program security and to compare
the relative security of different versions of the same program.
In this paper, we describe our program code metrics in
detail, as an extension of our earlier metrics for UML de-
signs [10] [11] and use a large-scale case study, involving
multiple programs, to show how the metrics can accurately
measure changes in the security of program code.
II. PROGRAM CODE SECURITY METRICS DEFINITIONS
This section defines our security metrics for assessing the
security level of programs. Our approach is based on static
analysis of the program code. For instance, when we say that
a method ‘accesses’ or ‘interacts with’ a classified attribute, it
means that the method’s compiled code contains an instruction
that may read or write an attribute labelled by the programmer
as ‘classified’. Of course, if this instruction appears within a
conditional statement, there is no guarantee that the method
will do so every time the program executes. Thus, our metrics
are safely conservative and measure the potential flow of
classified data.
A. Data Encapsulation-Based Security Metrics
Code security metrics based on data encapsulation aim
to statically measure the potential flow of information from
classified attributes and methods from the perspective of access
modifiers. These metrics consider attributes annotated by the
programmer as ‘classified’ or ones which derive their values
from classified attributes, and methods which access classified
attributes. They also measure whether the program imports the
Java reflection library due to the risk that this library can be
used by new code to access the value of any classified attribute
in an existing security-critical part of the program [18].
We divide the metrics for this property into four kinds of
accessibility: classified instance attributes (CIDA); classified
class attributes (CCDA); methods which access classified
attributes (COA) and accessibility through reflection (RPB).
The metrics are defined so as to penalise programs that make
classified attributes more accessible. Higher values indicate
higher accessibility to classified attributes and methods, and
hence a larger ‘attack surface’. This means a higher pos-
sibility for confidential data to be exposed to unauthorised
parties. Aiming for lower values of these metrics adheres
to the security principle of reducing the size of the attack
surface [14], [18]. Here we define the security metric RPB
while the descriptions and definitions of the CIDA, CCDA
and COA metrics can be found elsewhere [10].
Reflection Package Boolean (RPB): This code-level met-
ric measures the accessibility through reflection of classified
data in a given program. It is defined as “A boolean value
representing whether the Java program imports the Java re-
flection package (1) or not (0)”. This metric is only concerned
with whether or not the application itself is importing the Java
reflection library (i.e., information flow within the program
itself) and does not consider an attacker reflecting on the
application code elsewhere. The reflection metric equals 1 if
the program imports the Java reflection library or 0 otherwise.
Importing the Java reflection library means a higher possibility
for confidential data to be exposed to unauthorised parties.
RPB(P) =
{
1, if reflection imported
0, otherwise (1)
B. Cohesion-Based Security Metrics
The property of cohesion measures the interactions between
attributes and methods within a given class [19]. We have
previously defined four cohesion-based security metrics to
measure the potential flow of classified information caused by
interactions between methods and classified attributes in an
object-oriented design [10]. Programs with higher interaction
between methods and classified attributes have stronger cohe-
sion, and hence are less secure. The previously-defined metrics
are divided into four parts: the interactions of mutators (setters)
with classified attributes (CMAI); the interactions of accessors
(getters) with classified attributes (CAAI); the weight of clas-
sified attributes’ interactions with methods (CAIW); and the
proportion of classified methods (CMW). In this paper, we
extend these design-level metrics to include the proportion of
classified writing methods in the program (CWMP).
Classified Writing Methods Proportion (CWMP): This
metric aims to measure the proportion of methods which write
classified attributes in a particular program. We define this
metric as: “The ratio of the number of methods which write
classified attributes to the total number of classified methods in
the program”. In our case, we assume a writing method in Java
is one which writes an attribute to outside its class by calling
a method from the java.io package. This includes methods
whose class name contains either ‘write’, ‘print’, or ‘out’.
Therefore, a ‘classified writer’ is a method which uses one of
these classes to write a classified attribute. Fewer such methods
adheres to the principle of granting least privilege [17].
Consider the set of classified methods in a program P as
CM = {cm1, . . . ,cmn} and the set of the classified writing
methods as CWM = {cwm1, . . . ,cwmn} such that CWM⊆CM.
(Given a set S, let the magnitude operator |S| returns the size




C. Coupling-Based Security Metric
Our security coupling metric (CCC) for class designs [11]
measures the degree of potential flow of classified data caused
by the interactions between classes and classified attributes in
a given object-oriented design. This metric is adopted without
change for program code.
D. Composition-Based Security Metric
As explained previously [11], composition yields a (weak)
possibility of potential information flow for classified data.
In the case of programming in Java, it is possible to access
composed-part (inner) classes unless they are marked as pri-
vate. Hence, it is recommended to avoid using non-private
inner classes in security-critical code [20]. In our case, we
assume that using private composed-part classes should reduce
the potential flow of classified data, and hence produce more
secure programs. Our design-level composition-based metric
(CPCC) [11] is adopted for program code to measure this.
E. Extensibility-Based Security Metrics
To have more secure programs, classes and methods which
can access classified data should be prevented from being
extended by other classes and methods [20], [21], since doing
so makes classified data accessible in the new code. We have
identified two metrics (CCE and CME) which reward the use
of non-extended classes and methods [11].
Another such threat with regard to this property is code that
assigns classified values to a variable or parameter that is not
subsequently used, because this makes it possible to add code
to the program that accesses the classified data but has no
observable effect on the program’s behaviour. To prevent this
we need to identify classified values that are defined but not
used, classified methods that are declared but not called, and
critical classes that are never used. Thus, we define three new
code-level metrics which penalise unused classified attributes
(UACA), uncalled classified methods (UCAM) and unused
critical classes (UCAC) in a program.
These features could allow unauthorised parties to acquire
privileges on security-critical data without affecting the pro-
gram’s original behaviour. Making code inextensible elimi-
nates this risk, and hence reduces the possibility of information
flow from these attributes, methods and classes, which adheres
to the principle of granting the least privilege [17].
Unaccessed Assigned Classified Attribute (UACA): This
metric is define as “The ratio of the number of classified
attributes that are assigned but never used to the total number
of classified attributes in the program”. It measures those
classified attributes which are assigned, either directly by an
“=” assignment or by parameter passing through value or
reference, but never subsequently used.
Consider the set of classified attributes in a program P as
CA = {ca1, . . . ,can} and the set of classified attributes which
are assigned but never used in the same program as UCA =
{uca1, . . . ,ucan}, such that UCA ⊆ CA. Then, we define the




Uncalled Classified Accessor Method (UCAM): This
metric measures declared methods which access classified
attributes but are never called. It is defined as “The ratio of the
number of classified methods that access a classified attribute
but are never called by other methods to the total number of
classified methods in the program”.
Consider a set of classified methods in a program P as CM =
{cm1, . . . ,cmn} and classified accessors that are never called
by other methods UCM = {ucm1, . . . ,ucmn}, such that UCM⊆





Unused Critical Accessor Class (UCAC): This measures
classes which contain classified accessor methods that are
never used in any other classes. It is defined as “The ratio of
the number of classes which contain classified methods that
access classified attributes but are never used by other classes
to the total number of critical classes in the program”.
Consider the set of critical classes in a program P as CC =
{cc1, . . . ,ccn} and classes which have classified accessors that
are never used by other classes as UCC = {ucc1, . . . ,uccn},
such that UCC ⊆ CC. hen, we define the Unused Critical




F. Design Size-Based Security Metrics
With respect to security, a program with a large amount
of security-critical code has a higher chance of potential flow
of classified information, and hence is less secure [6]. It has
also been shown that security-sensitive classes must avoid
serialisation since this allows the values of private fields to
be accessed from outside the program [18]. Our design size-
based security metric (CDP) defined previously [11] already
measures the proportion of the program that is devoted to
security-critical classes (CDP). For program code we define
another security metric devoted to security-critical serialisable
classes (CSCP).
Critical Serialised Classes Proportion (CSCP): This
metric measures the risk associated with critical serialisable
classes in a given program. We define it as “The ratio of the
number of critical serialised classes to the total number of
critical classes in the program”. It rewards programs with a
smaller percentage and number of such classes and penalises
the use of security-critical serialisable classes. Therefore,
lower values of the CSCP metric indicates a lower propor-
tion of security-critical serialisable classes, which can give
privileges over confidential data, and thus satisfies the least
privilege principle [17].
Consider the set of the critical classes in program P as CC =
{cc1, . . . ,ccn} and the set of critical serialised classes is CSC =
{csc1, . . . ,cscn}, such that CSC ⊆ CC. Then, we define the




G. Inheritance-Based Security Metrics
The earlier design-level metrics [11] which consider inher-
itance are equally-applicable to program code. The include
metrics which penalise classes (CSP and CSI), methods (CMI),
and attribute (CAI) hierarchies in which classified data appears
near the top and is thus more accessible.
III. PROGRAM CODE SECURITY METRICS EXPERIMENTAL
RESULTS
To demonstrate the validity of our code-level metrics, and
show the capabilities of our Java Bytecode Security Anal-
yser [13], we conducted an experiment with several large-scale
open source Java programs. We used the tool to assess the
relative security of different versions of the same program. Our
hypothesis was that a program’s level of security should, on
average, improve over time, as bugs are fixed and the program
code is improved, although the addition of new security-critical
functionality may cause a worsening of overall security levels.
A. Approach
We began with five existing open source Java security
projects which were chosen from the most frequently down-
loaded security projects on the SourceForge website [22]. The
chosen programs consisted of the following: Jacksum, jGuard,
Kasai, JSecurity, and JXplorer. They all mainly concentrate
on providing a framework for handling authentication, autho-
rization, enterprise session management, and cryptography ser-
vices [22]. For each project, we chose a specific version which
was modified in a number of subsequent updates, to fix bugs
found in the previous releases. In this way we could compare
different versions of each program with identical functionality
but (hopefully) improved code quality. All of these programs
are security-related, so we could reasonably expect successive
releases to be more secure than their predecessors.
B. Program Annotations
First, we manually annotated at the Java source code
level a number of attributes in each project to be ‘classi-
fied’, choosing attributes whose names and associated code
comments indicated that they are likely to store confi-
dential data. We annotated the same attributes for all the
different releases of the same program in order to make
our comparisons fair. For example, in the program JSecu-
rity, classified attributes were: username, password and
rememberme in the UsernamePasswordToken class.
In the Kasai project, login, password and superUser
in the User class and in class Role id and name were










 0.9.0.A   384 3 1790 24 241 1
 0.9.0.B1   383 3 1822 24 245 1
 0.9.0.RC1   444 3 1996 24 261 1
 0.9.Stable   435 3 2028 23 309 1
 1.1.0.B1   86 5 498 49 51 2
 1.1.0.B2   86 5 506 54 51 2
 1.1.0.B3   86 5 506 54 51 2
 1.1.Stable   86 5 506 54 51 2
1.2 146 5 179 28 24 2
1.3 159 7 217 41 29 3
1.4 260 9 304 44 36 3
1.5 299 16 355 56 44 3
0.65.1   219 4 344 40 45 2
0.65.2   219 4 344 40 45 2
 0.65.3   219 4 344 40 45 2
 0.65.4   219 4 344 40 45 2
 3.2.B1   1985 96 3225 421 406 28
 3.2.B2   2075 113 3332 486 413 28
 3.2.B3   2072 142 3336 558 413 31
 3.2.Stable   2077 151 3345 518 415 31
JSecurity    
Kasai   
Jacksum   
jGuard   
JXplorer   
Table II: Data Encapsulation and Cohesion-Based Security Metrics
 Program   Version  CIDA  CCDA  COA  RPB  CMAI  CAAI  CAIW  CMW  CWMP
 0.9.0.A 0 0 1 1 0.0228 0.0037 0.0225 0.0134 0
 0.9.0.B1 0 0 1 1 0.0226 0.0036 0.0223 0.0132 0
 0.9.0.RC1 0 0 1 1 0.0208 0.0032 0.0205 0.012 0
 0.9.Stable 0 0 1 1 0.0207 0.0032 0.0206 0.0113 0
 1.1.0.B1 0 0 1 0 0.031 0.028 0.115 0.09 0
 1.1.0.B2 0 0 1 0 0.033 0.03 0.125 0.11 0
 1.1.0.B3 0 0 1 0 0.033 0.03 0.125 0.11 0
 1.1.Stable 0 0 1 0 0.033 0.03 0.125 0.11 0
1.2 0.8 0 1 0 0.05 0.034 0.08 0.156 0
1.3 0.6 0 0.976 0 0.047 0.044 0.116 0.189 0.024
1.4 0.4 0 0.931 0 0.029 0.034 0.088 0.145 0.023
1.5 0.25 0 0.928 0 0.022 0.03 0.123 0.158 0.036
 0.65.1 0.5 0 0.85 0 0.026 0.026 0.036 0.116 0
 0.65.2 0.5 0 0.85 0 0.026 0.026 0.036 0.116 0
 0.65.3 0.5 0 0.85 0 0.026 0.026 0.036 0.116 0
 0.65.4 0.5 0 0.85 0 0.026 0.026 0.036 0.116 0
 3.2.B1     0.8 0.01 0.94 1 0.0025 0.0028 0.081 0.131 0.007
 3.2.B2     0.8 0.008 0.92 1 0.0025 0.0026 0.088 0.146 0.006
 3.2.B3     0.81 0.02 0.92 1 0.0025 0.0024 0.105 0.167 0.007






annotated as classified attributes. In the Checksum project,
value, length, separator, and filename in class
AbstractChecksum, and val in class Crc16 were an-
notated as classified. In the JGuard project, name and
applicationName in the JGuardPrincipal class and
id and value in the JGuardCredential class were
annoated as classified. In the JXplorer project, uniqueID
and addressIP in the Name class and tag and name in
the ASN1Type class were annoated as classified.
C. Program Characteristics
Table I shows a number of static characteristics of the
studied programs after we annotated our choices of classified
attributes for each. The arrows show how each metric has
changed since the previous release. Upwards arrows (red) in-
dicate a worsening of security and downwards arrows (green)
indicate that security has improved. These characteristics are
one of the outputs of the JBSA tool. They include the total
number of attributes, classified attributes, methods, classified
methods, classes and critical classes for each program. In each
successive release of each project, most of these characteristics
either grew or stayed the same. For instance, the number of
classified methods, i.e., those which may access our annotated
attributes, either directly or indirectly, can be seen to grow
dramatically in successive revisions of Jacksum and JXplorer.
In order to show that our security metrics reflect the
program’s true security level, we inspected the code of some
of the analysed programs in this experiment. This inspection
aimed to show that our security metrics correctly mirror the
improvement or worsening of security caused by specific
changes to security-relevant code.
For instance, it was found that in program Kasai the second
release has added a number of additional methods some of
which contain a flow of classified information. One such
new method is overridePassword in class User which
interacts with the classified attribute password and does sim-
ilar operations to another existing method setPassword. It
thus creates an additional access point for classified attributes.
Table III: Coupling, Composition and Extensibility-Based Security Metrics
Program Version CCC CPCC CCE CME UACA UCAM UCAC
0.9.0.A 0.0111 1 1 1 0 0.75 0
0.9.0.B1 0.0109 1 1 1 0 0.75 0
0.9.0.RC1 0.0103 1 1 1 0 0.75 0
0.9.Stable 0.0054 1 1 1 0 0.75 0
1.1.0.B1 0.036 1 1 1 0 0.38 0
1.1.0.B2 0.04 1 1 1 0 0.36 0
1.1.0.B3 0.04 1 1 1 0 0.36 0
1.1.Stable 0.04 1 1 1 0 0.36 0
1.2 0.087 1 1 1 0 0.71 0
1.3 0.061 1 1 1 0 0.75 0
1.4 0.048 1 1 1 0 0.8 0
1.5 0.033 1 1 0.98 0 0.85 0
0.65.1 0.0625 1 1 1 0 0.6 0
0.65.2 0.0625 1 1 1 0 0.6 0
0.65.3 0.0625 1 1 1 0 0.6 0
0.65.4 0.0625 1 1 1 0 0.6 0
3.2.B1 0.0098 1 1 1 0.029 0.74 0.18
3.2.B2 0.0094 1 1 1 0.032 0.73 0.22
3.2.B3 0.0086 1 1 1 0.04 0.74 0.23






Table IV: Design Size and Inheritance-Based Security Metrics
 Program Version  CDP  CSCP  CSP  CSI  CMI  CAI  
 0.9.0.A 0.0041 0 0 0 0 0
 0.9.0.B1 0.0041 0 0 0 0 0
 0.9.0.RC1 0.0038 0 0 0 0 0
 0.9.Stable 0.0032 0 0 0 0 0
 1.1.0.B1 0.039 0 0 0 0 0
 1.1.0.B2 0.039 0 0 0 0 0
 1.1.0.B3 0.039 0 0 0 0 0
 1.1.Stable 0.039 0 0 0 0 0
1.2 0.083 0 0.5 0.174 0.722 0.8
1.3 0.103 0 0.5 0.232 0.722 0.8
1.4 0.083 0 0.5 0.2 0.722 0.8
1.5 0.068 0 0.5 0.221 0.75 0.8
 0.65.1 0.044 0.5 0 0 0 0
 0.65.2 0.044 0.5 0 0 0 0
 0.65.3 0.044 0.5 0 0 0 0
 0.65.4 0.044 0.5 0 0 0 0
 3.2.B1 0.069 0.036 0 0 0 0
 3.2.B2 0.068 0.036 0 0 0 0
 3.2.B3 0.075 0.032 0 0 0 0






Similarly the second release of the Kasai program overloads
an existing security-critical method. Class KasaiFacade
has two methods called createUser that have a flow of
classified information. This means that there are more methods
in this release which interact with classified information than
in the previous release. In fact, these new methods have similar
responsibilities as existing ones and could have been avoided.
Another example was found in program Jacksum 1.3
which has a method getChecksumInstance that re-
turns classified information and is assigned to a new
non-classified attribute checksum. The method calling
getChecksumInstance thus exposes classified informa-
tion which could be exploited by unauthorised parties. There-
fore, we expect the security of Jacksum 1.3 to worsen due
to the additional vulnerabilities added to it and our security
metrics should reflect this change.
On the other hand, there are cases where a potential vul-
nerability has been removed from the program in a successive
release. This was found in program JSecurity where method
executeLogin in class FormAuthenticationFilter
that used to be a potential vulnerability in the third release
was deleted from the program’s fourth release. This has
resulted in reducing the number of insecure methods (i.e.,
those which interact with security-critical information). Such
changes could contribute to improvements in the program’s
overall security and therefore our security metrics should
reflect this improvement.
D. Programs Security Metrics Results
The results of calculating our code-level security metrics
(using our JBSA tool) for each release of each project are
summarised in Tables II to IV. Given that lower values of each
metric are considered more secure, programs whose metrics
decrease should be those whose security has improved. We
expected these security-related programs would improve their
overall security with each new release.
With regard to the results shown in the tables, two of
the five programs, JSecurity and Jacksum, show an obvious
improvement in their security metrics from previous versions.
An exception is jGuard whose metrics are unchanged for all
releases. This suggests that only insignificant changes were
made to the code which had no security impact at all. This
impression is confirmed by the characteristics in Table I which
reveal that no major changes were made to the code’s size
between releases. (Nevertheless, the program’s change log says
that a number of small bug fixes were made in each revision.)
The other exception is Kasai whose metrics in Table II
have slightly increased in value between releases 1.1.0.B1 and
1.1.0.B2, meaning a worsening in security, after which the
program was stable. From Table II this would appear to be
because the second release added eight new methods, five of
which were ‘classified’. These new methods account for the
slight increase in three of the cohesion and coupling-security
related metrics exhibited by the second version of the program.
A similar case is shown by the results of JXplorer where
some of its metrics often increased. The reason for this is
clearly shown by the program characteristics in Table I which
indicate that the program has had a significant amount of new
code added. Thus, the program has major increases in some of
its security metrics and worse security overall with regard to
those metrics. Nevertheless, some of the program’s metrics,
including COA, CAAI, CCC and CSCP, have managed to
decrease and thus its security has improved in this regard.
Comparing these results with the code inspections described
in Section III-C we see that our metrics for these programs
have accurately reflected the changes in the security of these
programs with regard to either removing or adding potential
security vulnerabilities. For instance, in Kasai’s second release
our security metrics that relate to measuring the security of
classified methods have shown that security has worsened in
this release as expected due to the addition of new security-
critical methods and attributes, which is the case for program
Jacksum 1.3 as well. On the other hand, security improved
for the JSecurity program’s fourth release as a potentially
vulnerable method was deleted. This change in the code
produced a corresponding decrease in metrics that measure the
proportion of classified methods (CMAI and CMW). However
because the deleted classified methods also interacted with
several non-classified attributes, the metric that measures the
proportion of classified interactions (CAIW) increased.
From this experiment, we can conclude that our security
metrics offer a simple, easy to apply and easy to interpret
approach to quantifying the security of a given program, once
it is properly annotated.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this work we have described a number of security metrics
for object-oriented programs which are measurable at the level
of bytecode instructions. Using this approach we capture the
exact behavior of a Java program in the Java Virtual Machine,
which gives accurate results. They provide developers with a
simple way of identifying and fixing security vulnerabilities
which might occur from the perspective of information flow
of confidential data. The security metrics were demonstrated
using a tool which analyses Java bytecode, applied to actual
large-scale Java projects. This case study produced results
which match our intuitions about the way a program’s security
changes as its code is extended or debugged.
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